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ABSTRACT
The <Brain Scan> as Ideograph
by Paige H. Welsh
Medical imaging devices have enabled doctors to render images of the brain without cutting into the
body. These images are colloquially called “brain scans.” Through journalism and mass dissemination
online, brain scans have become an example of Michael Calvin McGee’s “ideograph,” a language term
that subtly takes on outsized political and symbolic meaning to enforce state power. In conversation with
theories of new materialism, I situate the brain scan as an ideograph within Jenny Edbauer’s model of
rhetorical ecologies. The rhetorical force of the brain scan comes out of a collision between René
Descarte’s mind/body dualism, the medical model of disability, and the liberal discourse of madness. As
predicted by Michel Foucault’s theories of biopower and Falguni Sheth’s theories of madness and
racialization, the production of “normal” and “abnormal” categories legitimizes forcible intervention from
the state. Psychiatry justifies limiting the civil rights of abnormal or “ill” by arguing the difference in the
body—the brain—eliminates the mind. If the “mind” is not present, then it is not a crime to imprison or
abuse the bodies of neurodivergent people. The brain scan becomes the ideograph and material document
that reifies the state’s discourse on mental illness. The rhetoric science through materialist eliminationism
then defends the brain scan from criticism. To respect the lives of neurodivergent people, we should
reevaluate psychiatry and neuroscience through Bruno Latour’s critiques of scientific knowledge and
Isabelle Stenger’s call for “risky” research. A post-human approach to the question of consciousness will
allow us to reconsider current models of mental illness, justice, and accountability.
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Introduction

1.1

The conflict in the social and medical models of psychiatric disability

The medical model of psychiatric disability proposes viewing certain behaviors, beliefs, and moods as
symptoms of curable deficits generally located in the brain (Haegele & Hodge 193). While there is no
solid consensus on what exactly a disability is, the medical model assumes that the “patient” in discussion
is in a “sick role” where their condition is unwanted (Parsons 257). Conflict arises when unruly people
with psychiatric disabilities reject the premise that they are ill and decline treatment. A social disability
model would ask how a larger social structure that defines some bodies as aberrant generates the
problems of psychiatric disability. For example, if someone hears voices that others cannot, do we rush to
treat them because hearing voices is a danger akin to an infected wound or cancer, or are the struggles of
psychiatric disability caused by a society that reacts with fear and force?
Psychiatrically disabled people will often be subjected to the medical model even if they personally reject
it. As a case study, consider California’s laws. The 5150 legal code permits medical professionals or
police officers to detain people against their will for 72 hours if those persons are deemed a risk to
themselves or others, or “gravely disabled.” (California Legislative Information). If the patient does not
seem well enough to leave, a medical professional may extend the hold by 14 days under code 5250. The
14-day hold may be continuously renewed (Disability Rights California).
Although these laws are rhetorically positioned as helping sick people, one must consider the actual
conditions and outcomes of involuntarily holds. Both medical professionals and police officers have the
power to initiate involuntary treatment, and the criteria they follow are subjective. If someone is “unable
to maintain housing” or procure other fundamentals of survival, they may be categorized as gravely
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disabled. Anyone experiencing extreme poverty could be considered psychiatrically disabled under
California’s laws.
During treatment, patients may be kept in a communal space or solitary confinement within a hospital or
jail cell (Wiener). Patients also often report feeling unsafe and more anxious in psychiatric inpatient care
because of the employees and other patients in the clinic (Pelto-Piri et al.). In a study of 395 patients who
had received compulsory treatment, 69% described their confinement as traumatic or extremely
distressing in itself (Paksarian et al. 266). There is also growing evidence that involuntary holds may
increase the risk of suicide post-release (Wang and Colucci 169). Although involuntary holds are
nominally about restoring mental health, consider whether being arrested and placed in a jail cell would
have soothed you on the worst day of your life.
If we want to encourage healing and “mental health,” traumatizing a person to a point they no longer trust
the medical system seems counter-intuitive. Yet, when a patient asks to leave in-patient care, it is
“reasonable” to ignore them. A deep discourse, or rhetorical ecology, centuries in the making enables
doctors, police officers, and even neurotypical family members to ignore the psychiatric patient’s demand
for freedom. With the advent of medical imaging, a doctor can now look at the patient and imagine their
brain scan as a cover image for this discourse. The brain scan says this is not a person crying out but a
body that is damaged and inflamed.

2

1.2

The brain scan becomes an ideograph within a rhetorical ecology.

Figure 1: Examples of brain scans.
From left to right: An example of an MRI scan, an fMRI scan, and a PET scan. The MRI scan has
no colors because it represents a brain’s physical structures in a single instance in time. The fMRI
includes colors overlaid to describe the change of blood oxygenation in a brain region over a set
period of time. The PET scan indicates the presence of radioactivity in the blood. MRI image
from Di Muzio, Bruno. “Normal brain MRI.” Case study, Radiopaedia.org.
https://doi.org/10.53347/rID-41113. fMRI image from Shin, David. “What is fMRI?” Center for
Functional MRI in the Department of Radiology, UC San Diego School of Medicine.
Fmri.ucsd.edu. PET image from Holmes, Sophie, Traumatic Stress Brain Study Group, et al.
“Altered Metabotropic Glutamate Receptor 5 Markers in PTSD : In Vivo and Postmortem
Evidence.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
vol. 114, no. 31, Aug. 2017, pp. 8390–8395.
A brain scan is an image of a brain generated by medical imaging technology like an x-ray or an MRI
machine that “sees” inside the body without cutting it. Brain scan images may be three-dimensional
renderings or cross-sectional slices of a brain. X-ray machines may produce computerized axial
tomography (CAT) scans, single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) scans, and positron
emission tomography (PET) scans. These scans are part of a field called “nuclear medicine” because they
require a radiologist to inject a compound called a radiotracer into the bloodstream of the patient. The
radiotracer contains a small amount of radioactive material, usually attached to molecules very similar to
glucose, that the x-ray machine can detect. The “activity” in brain scans created through nuclear
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medicine is a representation of radioactivity in a brain region. Doctors and researchers interpret a high
presence of radioactive tracer in tissue as a high glucose uptake rate (Society of Nuclear Medicine &
Molecular Imaging). In the case of cognitive neuroscience (CNS), the rate of glucose uptake is then
interpreted as neural activity and can be extraordinarily useful for locating strokes, seizures, and other
neurological diseases (Vanitha). Some researchers take an additional interpretive step and assume that
glucose uptake in the brain is connected to specific mental activities and illnesses (Rose and Abi-Rached
78). If you see a fully rainbow-colored image of a brain lit-up with “activity,” it is likely a PET, CAT, or
SPECT scan. Generally, brain scans that represent “activity” describe the presence of radioactivity over
time (Dumit 52). For example, the color red on a PET scan may represent increased radioactivity in a
region of the brain over the course of ten minutes, while the color blue represents decreased radioactivity.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines produce images of brain tissues with magnetic fields and
radiowaves but no hazardous ionizing radiation, making them low-risk for patients and study participants.
A plain MRI image will provide detailed images of the morphology of the brain and body. A functional
MRI (fMRI) will show changes in blood flow over time. In images of fMRIs, researchers will overlay
colors to represent a change in blood flow (UC San Diego Center for Functional MRI). Brain scans that
look like a slice of tissue and convey morphological detail are likely MRI or fMRI scans. For both PET
scans and fMRI scans, it is important to keep in mind that the presence of color is a representation of data
as interpreted by statistical software and the researcher rather than a representation of the tissue itself.
Researchers compose brain scans as a rhetorical text. They carefully decide which machine they will use,
which radiotracer will be deployed, what slice of the brain they will image, and what software and
statistics package will process the data (Dumit 69-85). In a strictly diagnostic context, brain scans
persuade doctors and patients to take a course of treatment for tumors, strokes, aneurysms, etc. However,
brain scans take on a special rhetorical force if a researcher prepares them as evidence in a publication.
Although an individual researcher may not be thinking further beyond an article they intend to submit to
an academic journal, their brain scans will enter a larger rhetorical ecology.
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Jenny Edbauer describes the limitations of Lloyd Bitzer’s theory of the rhetorical situation, which tidily
bifurcates itself into exigence, the problem that sparked the need for persuasion; the audience, the people
being persuaded; and constraints, the ideas and material realities that limit the message (Bitzer 1-14;
Edbauer 1-8). In her words, “Public interactions bleed into wider social processes. The elements of the
rhetorical situation simply bleed.” The message, people, constraints, and exigencies continuously shape
each other. Although a researcher may imagine themselves composing the brain scan for contained
rhetorical exchanges with colleagues and editors, the text is actually entering a rhetorical ecology where
doctors, patients, the state, psychiatry, journalism, the internet, the machines, ideologies, and many other
elements are going to touch and alter each other.
To rhetorically analyze brain scans, it is useful to put Michael Calvin McGee’s concept of the ideograph
in conversation with Edbauer’s rhetorical ecologies. In a minimalist sketch, an ideograph is an abstract
language term that carries rhetorical force because a society’s members must agree with its hazy
normative goals to maintain social status (McGee 15). In McGee’s example, “equality” is an ideograph
because if you wish to be an American, you must commit yourself to loving “equality” even if you can’t
quite articulate what “equality” means in a nation that is socially stratified (8).
Although McGee’s ideograph can be critiqued along similar lines as Bitzer’s rhetorical situation—its
components feel too fixed—the ideograph is still useful if we allow it to “bleed.” A rhetorical ecology
whose constituents jostle and check each other somehow manages to maintain homeostasis. The discreet
power Michel Foucault describes in Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language needs
energy to keep active agents from moving around too much. The brain scan’s transmission modes have
energy and leave a mark. This analysis also situates the brain scan within new materialist rhetoric. As
Diane Coole and Samantha Frost explain: “…the human species is relocated within a natural environment
whose material forces themselves manifest certain agentic capacities and in which the domain of
unintended or unanticipated effects is considerably broadened” (10). Like the foundations of the
ideograph and Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, materialism has been historically structuralist. “New”
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materialism enlivens even inanimate objects with agency. Jane Bennet describes this as a “vital
materiality”—the objects around us have power (6-9).
For example, instead of simply acknowledging that a house exists, we must contend with how the
architecture of a poorly designed house pushes us through space with its floorplans, makes us order take
out because the counter space in the kitchen is inhospitable, and encourages us to look out at an ugly
billboard because that’s the only window with good lighting. This material hostility then alters the
inhabitants' ideas of “home” and shapes whether they do renovations or spend more time outside. The
house, the residents, and the concept of “home” are all in conversation with each other. Likewise, the
brain scan is simultaneously a word, a concept, and a material image. The brain scan has shaped ideology
and the people receiving the message. The impact of the brain scan on the people feeds into how they add
additional meaning to the brain scan. These aspects “bleed” into each other.

2

<Brain scans> as an ordinary language that poses a
normative goal

For the remainder of this thesis, I will use Ronald Lee’s convention of marking the brain scan’s
ideographic status by containing it within “< >” symbols (Lee 295).

2.1

A history of comparing heads

To understand the normative goals of <brain scans> we must examine how it is situated within a
history of eugenics and phrenology. In Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on
Language, Michel Foucault complicates the relationship between history and documents as a
source of knowledge. “The document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is primarily and
fundamentally memory; history is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of
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documentation with which it is inextricably linked” (7). Society creates and curates its
documentation to create an identity through its history, an undertaking that will inevitably be
informed by political power. He goes on:
The unity of discourses on madness would not be based upon the existence of the object
‘madness’, or the constitution of a single horizon of objectivity; it would be the interplay
of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time:
objects that are differentiated in daily practice, in law, in religious casuistry, in medical
diagnosis, objects that manifested in pathological descriptions, objects that are
circumscribed in by medical codes, practices, treatment and care. (32-33)
In the <brain scan> we have a document situated amongst other historical documents that create
the discourse on madness Foucault describes. Because madness is not a concrete object, it must
be stabilized by a network of practices and objects. When the <brain scan> is reified into an
object, it obscures the discourse supporting it. The materiality of the <brain scan> as a document
confuses the abstractness of madness as a concept.
To understand the <brain scan’s> position as a document supported by a discourse, it is helpful
to contextualize among its ancestors. In the first half of the 19th century, the pseudoscience of
phrenology attempted to predict the intelligence and character of people based on bumps in their
skull (Greenblatt 790). As Davi Thornton notes in his book, Brain Culture: Neuroscience and
Popular Media, today’s neurologists are aware of the legacy of phrenology and use neurologist
Dr. Antonio Damasio’s careful rhetorical positioning. “...Damasio claims to avoid the ‘trap’ of
phrenology by rejecting a simplistic notion of brain centers. As he writes, ‘There are “systems”
made up of several interconnected brain units...(49)” It’s a small step to go from saying the shape
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of the skull is zoned into personality traits to saying it is actually the tissues that are zoned. When
a “normal” and a “disordered” <brain scan> are placed side by side, it invites the viewer to
interpret the materiality of a brain as evidence of a person’s character.
The focus on race along with poor data mostly delegitimized phrenology to current neurologists.
However, peer-reviewed articles on neurology still offer some praise to phrenologists for kickstarting investigations into the brain. An abstract on the legacy of phrenology appears in The
Journal of Neurosurgery says, “It is important to acknowledge the pioneers of this pre-imaging
epoch, who applied creativity and ingenuity to tackle the challenge of reproducibly and reliably
accessing a specific target in the brain” (Serletis). The authors go on to describe the race science
of the time as “controversial,” and offer no further elaboration. The tone towards phrenology is
cautious but applauds the attempt. I bring up this article because even if it is the perspective of
just its authors, it survived peer review and was considered fit for publication in The Journal of
Neurosurgery, a respected journal in the field in 2016.
The side-by-side <brain scan> has uncomfortable parallels to side-by-side comparisons of the
plaster skulls used by phrenologists. In Materials of the Mind, James Poskett examines how the
material props of phrenology were integral to propagating its legitimacy as a science in the
public’s mind, even if much of the scientific community had its reservations. The questions of
phrenology were based on the preemptive belief that racial categories, social constructs led by
the gaze of European colonizers and settlers. While phrenology did take off in other cultures,
White phrenologists positioned the skull of a White person as the “normal” against which other
races were compared. For example, White phrenologists considered Inuit people “cold hearted”
because of cultural differences in burial rights and mapped that culturally biased character
assessment onto contours on the skulls of Inuit people (45).
8

The plaster skull casts were relatively cheap and easy to obtain. The same “samples” were
reproduced again and again. Anyone with extra spending money could purchase a few and begin
analyzing “the research.”
The authority of the cast was further reinforced through its reproducibility. Most fledgling
phrenological societies…purchased a collection from O’Neil and Son, rather than
procuring skulls themselves. Adopting the language of print, [George] Combe [a
spokesperson for phrenology] described these as “published” specimens. In the end, the
material and rhetorical production of an “average specimen” allowed the phrenologists to
mitigate the questionable authority of their original collections. (54)
In short, repeated data comes to be misunderstood as abundant data. A century later, we no
longer use so many plaster casts, but we do have infinitely reproducible digital images that can
be passed around the internet. There’s an uncanny resemblance between the nineteenth-century
phrenologist who presents the same reproducible plaster casts, side by side, to the public for
interpretation, and the wellness thought leader who presents a digital image of <brain scans>, decontextualized, side by side on a blog. It is an excellent case study of what Bruno Latour
describes as the rhetoric of technoscience: “…a weak rhetoric becoming stronger and stronger as
time passes, as laboratories get equipped, articles published and new resources brought to bear
on harder and harder controversies” (103).
Accounts from people who have survived strokes and traumatic brain injuries evidence that
material conditions of the brain impact cognition (Al-Qazzazz et al. 1677; Arciniegas et al. 43).
CNS research can help create medicine and procedures that alleviate tremendous suffering for
those who want them. What I want to interrogate are the research questions CNS chooses to
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devote its resources to. The search for bodily difference through concepts as political as
“madness” or “character” is not objective. In both CNS and phrenology, hypotheses about
bodily difference are rooted in socially-constructed premises. “Evidence” is then symbolically
represented in mass-produced objects and presented to the public in the name of science
education. What is the goal of educating people on the materiality of “normal” and “other”?
Who is served?
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Figure 2: Criminal brains
“Massachusetts department of mental diseases exhibits pictures of 50 criminal brains.” From Cold Spring
Harbor, E.06 Eug-2, Exhibits Book-Second Int. Ex. Of eugenics, pg 119. Image hosted by
eugenicsarchive.org.

In Figure 2, we can see a transition photo from the side-to-side comparison of plaster skulls to
the side-to-side <brain scans> of current psychiatry. Taken in 1921, the photos of the “criminal”
brains are captioned with terse explanations like “alcoholic vagrant” and “sex pervert.” Except
for the brain labeled “rape,” all the criminal brains came from unhoused people, presumably
experiencing extreme poverty. Someone in 2022 may balk at blatantly grouping unhoused,
11

criminal, and mad brains together in this spread. However, recall that as of writing this thesis,
police in California still have the power to say someone is “critically disabled” if they cannot
house themselves imprison them in jail for their “mental health.” I question if much has changed.
The shapes are described as “short,” “narrow,” or “square.” Knowledge of the parents and
ethnicity is also noted. Perhaps most telling is how the two post-mortem “Normal” brains have
no explanation at all. They simply are. Those who are ruly do not need to account for the shapes
of their brains. Having two normal brains situated amongst six criminal brains also implicitly
argues that the route to being normal is narrow, and criminality is diverse. Easier to transport
than a case of plaster skulls, the images like Figure 2 benefitted from photography and mass
printing technologies. Since then, the printed image has been succeeded by the digital one.

2.2

The mass proliferation of <brain scan> images online and in
journalism.

Figure 3: PET scans comparison of “normal” and “PTSD” brain.
A screenshot of the side-by-side comparison of a “normal” person’s brain scan and a PTSD patient’s
brain scan from Hathaway, Bill. “New PTSD study identifies potential path to treatment.” YaleNews. 17
July 2017.
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I initially encountered a version of Figure 3 in a TEDTalk given by Dr. Jay Kumar, a Chapman
University faculty member who also runs the university wellness department. As I went down the
rabbit hole to find its origin, I discovered the image had a rich life online. Here are just a few places
I found it (full citations in the bibliography):
•

A Facebook post from the charity PTSDUK.

•

A page about a podcast run by Cal OES News, titled “Podcast #79: Lifetime of
Emergencies Nearly Sent California Fire Battalion Chief Past the Point of No Return.”

•

A post from Neuroscience News titled “Potential New Path For PTSD Treatment.”

•

A post from SmallJOYSLife.com titled “Ariana Grande Shared Brain Scan Showing Her
PTSD Years After the Terrorist Attack on her Manchester Concert.”

•

A slideshow from WebMD titled “How Conditions Change Your Brain.”

•

A blog post from The Center for Law, Brain & Behavior titled, “Defendant’s Death
Sentence Upheld After Ohio Supreme Court Questions Validity of Conclusions Drawn
From Brain Scans.”

None of the sources ever claim that the image in question is of a person explicitly involved in the
content. For instance, in the Ariana Grande post, the scan is not attributed to Grande, but it is
placed adjacent to a description of a study conducted by Dr. Daniel Amen in 2015. Similarly, the
blog post about the person on death row uses the scans as the headliner image even though the
scan does not come from Anthony Kirkland, the man on trial. If one doesn’t read the fine print,
they could certainly get the impression that they are looking at Kirkland’s “damaged” brain. Like
the skulls used by the phrenologists, the digital comparison and a normal brain and a PTSD brain
are being copied and then dispersed in new contexts for broad public consumption.
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I eventually tracked down the original study it came from and confirmed its origin with Dr. Irina
Esterlis, a researcher involved in taking the scans. The paper Dr. Esterlis referred me to, “Altered
metabotropic glutamate receptor 5 markers in PTSD: In vivo and postmortem evidence,” does
not include the exact graphic that she gave to the communications person who wrote the
YaleNews article. In Figure 4, you can see that the “healthy control” or HC scan looks quite
different from the No PTSD scan in Figure 3. The PTSD scan is also different but less
discernably so. In our email exchange, Dr. Esterlis did not explain why the images were
different—only that the image in YaleNews came from her and this study. Regardless, Figure 3
came from a study with just 32 participants—16 diagnosed with PTSD and 16 healthy controls.
The <brain scans> that have been dispersed around the internet represent just two of them.
The reproduction of the phrenologist’s plaster skulls and then the eugenicist’s prints, are now
succeeded by digital reproductions. Perhaps most concerning, digital reproductions can cost
nothing to copy and redistribute. As of my writing this in March 2022, Figure 3 is the second
result that appears on Google images when I search the terms “PTSD brain scan.” The
dissemination of these images without context is easier now than ever in human history.
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Figure 4: PTSD PET scan image used in original article.
PET scans of a person diagnosed with PTSD compared to the PET scans of a person deemed a healthy
control or “HC.” From Holmes, Sophie, Traumatic Stress Brain Study Group, et al. “Altered
Metabotropic Glutamate Receptor 5 Markers in PTSD : In Vivo and Postmortem Evidence.” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 114, no. 31, Aug. 2017, pp.
8390–8395.
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3

<Brain scans> as warranting the use of power and otherwise
unacceptable social actions.

3.1

Mind body dualism, and the creation of empty bodies

Compulsory “treatment” exists in conflict with the medical model that assumes a sick patient
who wants treatment. To overcome this problem, psychiatry leans on Cartesian dualism to create
a patient who would consent to treatment. The body is estranged from the mind when René
Descartes considers the case of a man who drinks in desperate thirst when drinking may kill
him, an irrational act. Descartes writes, “Perhaps it could be said here that they erred because
their nature was corrupt. However, this does not remove our difficulty, for a sick man is no less a
creature of God than a healthy one, and thus it seems no less inconsistent that the sick man got a
deception-prone nature from God” (100). Descartes is resolved that God is not a deceiver and
does not dole out imperfect minds. The mind is intact and “indivisible” but like a poorly made
clock, the body has failed, specifically the part of the brain that governs “common sense” (101).
Implicitly, someone who is irrational, who is “out of their mind,” has something wrong with their
brain. Imperfections in the brain block the fruition of the mind God intended. The self is
contained in an almost ghostly presence haunting a body. If the mind and body are separate, then
there is a ghostly soul, a Platonic essence, of a person untainted by “brain diseases.” In her essay,
“Toward a Pathology of the Possessed,” Esmé Weijen Wang describes the treatment of people
deemed severely mentally ill in terms of exorcism. Similar to how extreme measures in an
exorcism are justified to save the soul sharing a body with the demon, extreme measures of
medication and imprisonment are warranted to save the soul of a mentally ill person from their
own diseased brain. All protests against interventions from mental health professionals are
16

interpreted as utterances of the pathology and thus reasonable to disregard. The brain becomes
the broken house of the mind or soul.
Here we can now see the urgency to find a corporeal pathology on a <brain scan>. The scientism
of the <brain scan> ideograph can be used to “inflict penalties on those who…refuse to respond
appropriately to claims on their behavior warranted through the agency of ideographs” as McGee
describes (15). If the state can prove “mentally ill” people have a brain disease, all tools to make
them ruly are on the table. The tools used, of course, will be decided on a case-to-case basis.
McGee is right in that “[a] degree of tolerance is usual”—people with a psychiatric disability
who accept their status as ill and consent to treatment can maintain outpatient care, but those
who refuse or are unable to become ruly will be imprisoned.
As Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison, modernity attempts to
touch the body as little as possible when punishing the unruly: “The body now serves as an
instrument or intermediary if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or make it work, it is in order
to deprive the individual of liberty that is regarded as both a right and as a property” (11). If you
can convince someone to medicate themselves in outpatient, under the threat of losing their
liberty, the state appears to be hands-off. Imprisonment is intended only to punish the mind, and
if the mind is absent due to illness, imprisonment becomes morally neutral. Foucault also
examines how nineteenth-century laws said crimes committed amid madness were not crimes in
the sense of moral accountability, but the punishment, imprisonment, was the same (20). In a
society that acknowledges madness as a discourse, every crime could originate in an illness.
Thus, this society must talk itself in circles deciding whether the people imprisoned are being
“treated and rehabilitated” or “punished.”
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In the context of the United States mass incarceration of disproportionately Black, brown, and
indigenous people, we must also consider how race impacts what is acceptable in psychiatry.
John Harfouch elucidated in his book, Another Mind Body Problem, A History of Racial NonBeing, how Immanuel Kant’s expansion on the discourse of mind-body dualism theorized people
who weren’t White, not just as inferior, but as non-existent:
…in Western metaphysics, a sheep is not nothing. A sheep is a being. A sheep has a why,
a reason, a ground. The Tahitians are radically other than sheep, since they could be
Tahitians or they could be sheep, but they have reason to be neither sheep nor Tahitian.
They occupy an alterity not just to sheep but to any being whatsoever, just as non-being
designates a radical alterity to being. It is then precisely not the case that the Tahitians are
inferior, like animals, but rather they are without reason, or without any ground whatsoever.
(151)
To Kant’s thinking, if humans are made to progress culture through rationality and invention,
non-White people whose cultures have not “achieved” this are “waste” in God’s universe.
Harfouch goes on to point out how a rhetoric of non-being is conducive to genocidal thinking. If
people are not working as Kant’s God intended, then it would be better to annihilate them.
In Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, Falguni Sheth defines race as a technology the state
uses to preserve itself—“… race becomes a way of organizing and managing populations in
order to attain certain societal goals, such as political coherence, social unity, and a wellfunctioning economy” (22). Drawing from Michel Foucault’s theories of biopower, Sheth
examines how madness makes surrounding people in society uncomfortable. The strange seem
unpredictable, suspicious, and liable to disrupt social harmony. A “real” category is constructed
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to mark out an “Other.” “The ‘unruly’ denotes the real in association with its perceived degree of
threat” (69).
Anxieties about the presence of mad people walking amongst the rational and their subsequent
confinement become a template for racializing other “unruly” populations. Indeed, the history of
treating “insane” enslaved African Americans in nineteenth century asylums informed the
models of psychiatric care that are replicated today in prisons (Gonaver 173). This also bears out
in the data around the diagnosis of psychosis and compulsory imprisonment, which
disproportionately affects Black Americans (Schwartz & Blankenship 133). Jails in New York,
Los Angeles, and Chicago are also the largest “mental health care providers” in the United
States, and they disproportionately imprison Black and Latine people (Sakala; Roth).
Madness and race are intertwined in categorizing the unruly. It follows that in a rationalist liberal
society, medical institutions would reach to find a biological marker that categorizes the mad as
the eugenics movement attempted to biologically legitimize categories of race. In his book,
Brain Cultures, Davi Thornton writes, “Brain disease is in [neurologist, Antonio] Damasio’s
rendering, a ‘disease of the will’ in that it renders human will ineffective. The conclusion
Damasio draws is that individuals should not be blamed or punished for negative behaviors and
attitudes that result from these brain diseases” (52). Such a position has profound implications
for a justice system that understands imprisonment as punishment for a moral failing. How can it
be fair to punish people for a disease? Here we run into the “behavior or belief which might
otherwise be perceived as eccentric or anti-social” that McGee says the ideograph legitimizes
(McGee 15). The liberal state calls imprisonment “treatment.”
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Kant’s logic underpins the eugenics campaigns of extermination and mass sterilization.
Psychiatry has a sordid history of recommending patients to governments for sterilization and
execution (Strous & Brendel 30; Biley 365). The United States had an active program to sterilize
the “defectives” and “feeble-minded” throughout the 20th century. Racialized people,
immigrants, and the poor are disproportionately targeted in an effort to create a master race
(Ladd-Taylor; Black). The way eugenicists feel about disabled and racialized others dovetails in
how they perceive there to be “no there there” as far as a mind. For the racialized non-being, the
mind is already absent. For the psychiatric patient, the mind is floating above, not quite in the
imperfect body. Absent of a mind given by God, it is not a crime to destroy the body.

3.2

Case study: NAMI’s bid to end stigma.

In Science in Action, Latour describes how science creates myths to explain how people drift
from the “straight” linear path of rationality and logic. Knowledge is posited as objective and
beliefs as subjective.
What is needed to follow the right path is just a sound mind and a sound method. What is
necessary, on the other hand, to account for the distorted path of believers? Lots of
factors which can be chosen from among a long list including ‘culture,’ ‘race’ ‘brain
anomalies’, ‘psychological phenomena’ and, of course ‘social factors.’” (184)
It is on the nose for Latour to explicitly call out ‘brain anomalies.’ Now all patients with
abnormal <brain scans> are cast out of the knowledge and into belief. It’s an old observation that
the patient in the care of the psychiatrist has virtually no epistemological standing. Creating
<brain scan> ideographs and distributing them to the public for interpretation and consumption
legitimizes ignoring patients.
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As a case in point, consider how The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), an
organization largely led by neurotypical family members of neurodivergent family members,
hopes <brain scans> will combat stigma against “severe mental illness” while also advocating
for laws that would give doctors and neurotypical family members more legal power to
involuntarily commit and medicate psychiatric patients (NAMI; Rosenburg). I put “severe
mental illness” in quotes because NAMI has a problematic habit of dismissing its critics as not
understanding “severe mental illness”—a convenient use of the “elliptic rhetoric” Yergeau
describes in their book Authoring Autism. (NAMI New Hampshire; Yergeau 50). When
disability is put on a spectrum, medical authority figures may claim any disabled person who
critiques them is not actually disabled enough to have relevant experience. On the flip side,
anyone who “severely mentally ill” isn’t well enough to critique NAMI.
There is an important rhetorical hand-off in NAMI’s goals to normalize mental illness. The
emphasis on lessening “stigma” is a bid for normalization contingent on treatment. Patients can
have a reprieve from “stigma” if they accept they have a disease, as evidenced by the <brain
scans>. Of course, if the patient says they don’t have a disease, that denial is more proof they are
sick and more laws must be passed to save them. When NAMI manages to pass laws that shrink
the civil rights of psychiatrically disabled people, patients are pulled deeper into the medical
model and imprisonment even if there is supposedly less stigma against their absent mind.

3.3

Case study: Guilt as a symptom in The Body Keeps Score.

The Body Keeps Score, a massively popular self-help book written by psychiatrist Dr. Bessel van
der Kolk, has been lauded by many trauma survivors. When he refers to his patient's <brain
scans>, van der Kolk attempts to explain their behavior materially in a plea for trauma survivors
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diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and their communities to believe their
pain. When communities alienate survivors for experiencing panic attacks, rage, addiction,
depression, among other things, a <brain scan> becomes a key come home. The PTSD patient
and their community may contain all that unruly behavior to a disease photographed on a <brain
scan> like a tumor. The community may then forgive the patient and safely put the traumatic
events in the past. Human suffering was a disease the entire time.
In the book, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk diagnosed a veteran who returned from the Vietnam War
with PTSD. The trauma that spurred the disease was first the murder of the veteran’s friend and
then the actions the veteran took in revenge: “The day after the ambush Tom went into a frenzy
to a neighboring village, killing children, shooting an innocent farmer, and raping a Vietnamese
woman” (22). The text then deftly enfolds the war crime in the language of trauma and PTSD. In
later chapters, van der Kolk goes into iterative descriptions of what such traumas do to brains.
Implicitly, it is not healthy to feel bad after killing and raping people because guilt is a symptom
of PTSD, a disease. The patient can be treated by yoga, van der Kolk’s eye motion
desensitization, and reprocessing therapy and then move on with their life. As I will explore later
in this thesis, I do not see punishment and shunning as a better alternative. However, in
diagnoses of PTSD, I observe a mandate not just for the patient but for all people around the
patient to forget what happened in the first place. Like the discussion of the trauma inflicted on
the veteran’s victims, looking back at the war and questioning the state’s role in this crime is
foreclosed.
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3.4

Case study: Jay Kumar’s description of American politics as a
traumatized brain.

I now return to my initial encounter with the brain scan image in question: Jay Kumar’s
TEDTalk. The presentation blends the rhetoric of wellness and spirituality with the exclusive
parameters of scientific rationality. Kumar’s central premise is we can understand United States’
political divide between “the right” and “the left” by thinking about the country as a
metaphorical brain with PTSD. He presents the mystery scan as a visual aid. “PTSD impairs the
inter-hemisphere connectivity in the brain. What this means: PTSD weakens the connection, the
communication between the brain’s right and left hemispheres. In the same way, America’s
PTSD drives the disconnect and discontent in America’s right and left political parties.”
Kumar says that to achieve “health,” both sides must communicate; a statement that doesn’t even
hold up as a neurology metaphor considering dividing the brain hemispheres is a common
surgical procedure for people with severe epilepsy. He elaborates, “Likewise, a healthy
American democracy requires the operational partnership between America’s right and left
parties.” Kumar suggests that to get past this divide, America must bring up and recognize its
past suffering and trauma, which are, in his words, “America’s painful past” or “topics such as
racial trauma.” Considering the mass protests against George Floyd’s murder by a police officer
that happened in the summer of 2020, I would specifically suggest the racial trauma he refers to
is the legacy of slavery, Jim Crow, and police brutality. Kumar then describes the symptoms of
PTSD as avoidance and distorted recollection. “It’s natural for segments of society to react
defensively. This impulse is to deny or downplay the extent of the trauma.”
Kumar’s framing is a case study in how the scientism of <brain scans> blended with wellness
through mental health can be leveraged to support the narrative of dominant power. Mapping this
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stance back onto the brain, it seems that the traumatized people here are White people, who want
to deny racism. After all, Black people have always had to live with “America’s racial trauma”
and navigate White defensiveness to survive. In this framing, White people show signs of
clinically certified trauma, even though they are the ones inflicting violence. If you choose to
interpret the traumatized ones as Black people, then you must infer that their traumatized
memory is “distorted” as well, a convenient rhetorical route for calling legitimate grievance
irrational. Because Kumar never explicitly says who is traumatized, who is defensive, and who
has distorted memory, you can never quite put together who is committing harm. By never
taking a side, Kumar can claim to be on everyone’s side. Of course, when you opt for neutrality,
you let the people committing harm center their discomfort with accountability as illness.
Rhetorically, the traumatized White brain is wounded, but its soul is innocent. The problem is
not a lack of accountability or justice—it is a brain disease.
The treatment for the brain disease will vary depending on who has the trauma and why. If you
are White, you can garner victimhood and sympathy for reacting “defensively.” If you are Black,
you must accept your trauma is in the past—Kumar maintains the racial trauma is in the past and
not an ongoing problem—or be imprisoned for unruly protest. If it seems inconsistent in who is
imprisoned versus who may be healed, that is a feature, not a bug. The rhetoric of brain disease
can maintain the innocence of the soul and to validate force.
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4

Training the public to read their own <brain scans>

4.1

The patient sees themselves as an object.

When we examine the <brain scan> in Figure 3, it is so alien to the anticipated signifiers of the
body, people who have not been trained in radiology, or even the specific parameters of the
study, would not be able to locate “the normal.” In fact, the <brain scans> don’t look especially
different from one another. One has slightly more reds and oranges and fewer purples and blues.
It resembles another psychological site of interpretation: the Rorschach test. If it says anything
about my mind, I see a squat creature with an angry face in the <brain scan.>
The cut of Figure 3 also looks as if we are gazing down on the brain from above. Implicit is the
power to be the looker, and not to be seen. It is an intimate view. We are seeing inside someone,
into spaces they would never see themselves. We know nothing of the people who were scanned.
and may pour whoever we like into a “normal brain” versus a “PTSD” brain. A normal brain
presumably serves a normal person: working, maintaining relationships, sleeping through the
night. Implicitly, it is normal to never experience trauma. All people who are more likely to
experience trauma—people in poverty, people living in war zones, women, queer people, people
of color, disabled people—are also more likely to slip into a scientifically legitimized state of
abnormality. If you have suffered, maybe you look at the scans and imagine running yourself
through an MRI. You wonder if there is too much redness and not enough eggplant purple in
your own head. You, as a member of the <brain scan> ideograph consuming member of a liberal
society, are, as McGee puts it, “socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a
prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society” (15).
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In Madness and Civilization, Foucault describes a process of correcting delusional patients not
through force or chains, but by making patients see themselves as objects.
This then is the phase of abasement: presumptuously identified with the object of delirium,
the madman recognizes himself … his solid sovereignty as a subject dissolves in this object
he has demystified by accepting it. He is now pitilessly observing himself. And in the
silence of those who represent reason, and who have done nothing but hold up the perilous
mirror, he recognizes himself as objectively mad. (264)
Dr. Daniel Amen, a celebrity psychiatrist and public advocate of <brain scans>, describes
profound emotional reactions from his patients when he shows them their <brain scans>. Some
patients burst into tears as they are confronted with the “reality” of their disease (Tucker). I look
at the <brain scans> and imagine what my own might look like. I gaze inside myself as an object
with disordered colors. To quote Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached, “The act of
seeing…also involves a particular locale for the act of visualization—the designation of a case in
the asylum, the ‘demonstration’ of the patient of the patient in the clinic, the dissection of the
brain in the laboratory…”(55-56). By seeing a <brain scan>, I bring the lab inside myself.

4.2

Investing in patient status to keep from going crazy.

I’ve described NAMI as neurotypical-led organization that uses <brain scans> to put forward
ableist laws, but it’s also important to note that patient-led advocacy organizations use <brain
scan> science to garner social acceptance and resources. S. Scott Graham shows how
fibromyalgia patients found <brain scans> an effective rhetorical tool for securing social
validation and access to medications that relieve their pain. People who have been called “crazy”
may find formal diagnostic labels backed by a <brain scan> and the medical model a vehicle to
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more options, compassion, and funds through medical insurance (Graham 376). I have no doubt
that people with fibromyalgia suffer from their disease, and I believe they are entitled to these
resources. I mention this example to point out that sometimes patients have to “play the game”
and use whatever rhetorical tools they have at their disposal to get support.
People who have staked their understanding of psychiatric disability in the medical model, or
have to convince their insurance company to pay for therapy, have an investment in reifying
mental illness in the material through the ideograph of the <brain scan>. The term “crazy” still
marks no man's land between “mental illness” and “rationality” that appears in pop discourses
among even mental health experts. For example, in an article for Psychology Today, psychologist
and popular public speaker Dr. Jennifer Sweeton explains that it is helpful for traumatized
patients to understand the basic neurology behind a PTSD diagnosis because “...it may help you
realize that you’re not crazy, irreversibly damaged, or a bad person.” While Dr. Sweeton intends
to be consoling for those she considers ill, her phrasing implies that there are indeed crazy,
irreversibly damaged, and bad people. Deciding who is ill and who is crazy will come down to a
<brain scan>.
Bruno Latour proposes a post-human understanding of bodies in his article, “How to Talk About
the Body? The Normative Dimension of Science Studies.” Instead of seeing a body as a
container for the soul, it is a more phenomenological collection of practices that sense difference
and complexity. He presents as an example, a cohort of perfumery students who attain “a nose”
for perfume as they learn to perceive the nuances of scents. They do not have “a nose” until they
incorporate it into their sensory practice. Similarly, the tools of scientific detection become
extensions of the scientist, and via this line of thought, the MRI or PET scan machine becomes
an extension of the psychiatrists’ or neurologist’s body. They slice painlessly to see inside. Then
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through the mass reproduction of images of <brain scans> on the internet, the public gets its own
“eye” for a normal <brain scan>.
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5

A heretical account of the <brain scan> through autoethnography

Reading accounts of Dr. Amen’s patients weeping upon seeing their <brain scans>, I realized I
had the opportunity to get a <brain scan> myself by participating as an “abnormal” subject in a
study at UC Irvine medical center. What follows is an autoethnography of that experience. I went
out to see if I would be convinced of my patient status once I encountered the ideograph in the
form of my own <brain scan>. All criticisms of autoethnography—its lack of scientific
standards, small “study sizes”, its emphasis of aesthetics, “narcissism”—may be lodged against
this account, and I embrace that (Ellis et al). I am building off autoethnography's roots refusing
the anthropologist’s gaze, and offer this account as a challenge to the epistemological positioning
of psychiatric patients in medicine. This is an observation of being observed.

5.1

The process of the getting a <brain scan>.

When I was initially recruited for an MRI <brain scan> study investigating whether my
diagnosis influences memory and hippocampus size, I said no. I had an uneasy appointment with
the resident who replaced my previous doctor. Since she was still a student, it was unclear if her
uneasiness was with her new role as a doctor or the specifics of my diagnosis. Although I had
been living well for a year—steady sleep, thriving in grad school, exercising, eating vegetables,
the usual checklist—she proposed changing my meds. It felt a bit like when a new manager
comes onto the job and to justify their hiring finds something to reshuffle. I declined the change
to the meds. She reiterated her concerns but let it go. I was anxious I had lost some credibility by
being the disagreeable psych patient.
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Being unaware of one’s illness is considered a symptom. As an outpatient, it is less of a hazard,
but the question lingers. Is there a note on my file that could make problems for me later? It
sounds paranoid until you are within the institution of psychiatry. Waiting for an appointment at
the hospital, the alarms for a code grey went off. Security guards ran down the hall to stop
someone from the in-patient section from doing something—maybe running away or punching a
technician. Near my psychiatrist’s desk was a prominent button that he could hit to call security.
They say it’s for emergencies, but you just have to take the doctor’s word on that.
When the hospital began calling, again and again, leaving cryptic voice mails, I was afraid they
were calling to relitigate my medication. Instead, a woman with a British accent informed me I
had qualified for a <brain scan> study. I imagined my brain rendered in the rainbow colors of the
PET scan. What if something inside me is misshapen, and I should surrender my judgment to
others. I turned her down, but then I began the research for this thesis and reconsidered. I wanted
to know what would happen if I saw my <brain scan> as simultaneously an abnormal participant
and someone beginning to critique the epistemology of psychiatry. I emailed the researcher
leading the study about changing my mind, and we started shortly thereafter.
There were three steps to the study. First, we would have an extended interview over Zoom to
discuss my history and double-check that I qualified for the study. Second, I would come to the
hospital to do “brain games,” essentially memory and cognitive ability tests. At the end of the
second session, I would get a blood draw to confirm that my kidneys could filter out the contrast
dye used during the MRI scan. Third, I would get in the MRI machine and have the <brain
scan>. I was paid roughly $25 per hour for my time in cash immediately after each in-person
session.
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The Zoom interview about my history was more emotionally exhausting than anticipated. We
went efficiently through some of the saddest months of my life, and I rated those experiences on
a ten-point scale or gave a yes/no answers. The questions used to rate my symptoms sometimes
gave me pause.
“Have you ever thought that other people were talking about you?”
Well, yes. I talk about other people. Doesn’t it make sense that sometimes they talk about me? I
don’t know how that response was rated.
“Have you ever felt someone was out to get you?”
Yes. One time a man kept hitting on me at work. When I told him to leave me alone in polite
office speak, he started to check my copy for typos and forward them to my manager whenever
he found them. If I arrived late to the office, he announced it to everyone on the first floor. I
don’t know how that response was rated.
“Have you ever had a religious experience?”
Sometimes I feel I see my life from a thousand feet up, suddenly at peace. I understand I am
doing the best I can, and it’s all going to be okay because the world will continue after I die. The
researcher said that sounded like a great mindfulness trick. I also don’t know how she rated that
response. It is amusing to me that most people who regularly attend church get a point added to
their psychosis rating. Time and culture have changed the context of what is ill. She also asked if
I had ever been diagnosed with PTSD. I said a few experiences in my life were so shocking they
altered the way I experience consciousness, but no, I have not been formally diagnosed with
PTSD.
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The second session took place at the hospital. All the researchers and hospital staff I interacted
with were professional and polite. This is likely not representative of all participants’
experiences. As a thin White woman with no visible disabilities, people are generally polite to
me so long as I am agreeable. Still, at most medical appointments, long waits past your
appointment time and clipped interactions with doctors are reminders that you are one of many
pressing obligations. Considering how hard it is to find candidates, researchers in a study are
eager to make sure you come back to complete all study steps. We started exactly on time, and
everyone seemed unusually cheerful.
The night before the study, I had not slept well. Menstrual cramps kept me up, so I arrived on
maybe five hours of sleep. I also had considerable “brain fog,” so my results were going to be
extra abnormal. Here are a few of the activities I completed in a quiet office with the researcher.
I drew a line through a maze as quickly as possible during one. By the final maze, I had
developed a maze running strategy and did the final maze faster than the previous ones even
though it was more complicated. The researcher commented that that had never happened before.
In another activity, she read out a list of items and asked me to recite back as many as I
remember. Another, I looked at six images of simple geometric figures and then drew them to
the best of my memory. We repeated this with the same six images three times. The impressions
of the previous drawings were etched in the paper, so I focused on memorizing new components.
By the third try, the reproductions were perfect. I didn’t mention my “cheating” because I felt it
wasn’t my role as the participant to critique the study design.
I struggled to translate symbols into a list of numbers based on a key at the top of the page.
Although I am right-handed, I hold pens like a leftie. My forearm covered the key because of
how the activity was laid out. I had to lift up my arm and adjust the paper whenever I wanted to
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check the key. Generally, after an activity, the researcher told me I did a great job. Based on her
less enthusiastic reaction to the symbol translation activity, I sensed I tanked it.
We moved on to computer activities. During one, I watched stock photos of innocuous items
flash across the screen. After a short break I watched more stock photos flash by on the screen,
and if I saw a repeated image, I would click. I am trigger happy. There were several where I
clicked and then realized I had actually not seen the item on second glance before. My read-out
probably said I remembered many rakes, bananas, and toy trucks that were actually brand new.
There were many more activities. I suspect by diversifying the tasks, the researcher hoped to
average out problematic results, but I can’t know for sure until they publish. This is a reasonable
research practice. I believe the researchers were doing their best to get objective data with the
peer-reviewed tools they had available. However, I bring up the limitations of their study design
so you can understand how many factors impact the quantitative data psychiatrists lean on. It is
exceedingly difficult to get controlled data from research subjects as complex as human beings
moving through the world.
I was offered many cups of water throughout the brain games to keep my veins plump for the
blood draw. The researcher handed me seventy dollars cash and a fruit leather snack at the end. I
walked to the blood work clinic in a different building. Although we were still amid the
coronavirus pandemic (Nov 2021), the room was packed with older people wearing masks. Six
feet of distance was crunched down to more like 2-3 feet. It occurred to me that if I was to get
COVID-19, this would be just the place. I am also afraid of needles. I could see how many
participants would decide to take the money and run at this point—something the paperwork
made clear I had a right to do. I went through with the blood draw anyways. The seasoned
hospital phlebotomist got my vein on the first try.
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Around two weeks later, the lab confirmed that my kidneys could filter out the contrast dye. I
scheduled an MRI for the evening when the hospital was much quieter. When I arrived, I filled
out a few forms, and shortly after changed into a hospital gown. All bits of metal, wedding ring
and glasses included, had to come off and stay in a locker. The room with the tube-shaped MRI
machine in the center was surprisingly spacious. The technician instructed me to lie down on the
table and explained the basic procedures as she gave me foam earplugs and a rubber bulb on a
wire. I may feel a bit warm in the machine, but if I felt burning anywhere, I should squeeze a
bulb immediately to end the scan. She gave me a headset that played soothing ambient music
ideal for contemplating fish at the aquarium. Then she put a sort of plastic cage on my head. It
included a mirror that allowed me to look past my feet out the tube. The table I was lying on
began to rise, and she put the IV in my arm. I don’t have enough experience with IVs to know
how they typically feel, but this one dully hurt throughout the scan. It was essential to keep my
arm with the IV still and straight.
The table slid into the machine. I’m not claustrophobic, but I would not say it was comfortable.
Between the snug space, the strange banging of the machine, the aquarium music, and holding
myself very still, I felt like I was in the escape pod of a science-fiction movie. The scan lasted
about 40 minutes. Halfway through, they pumped in the contrast dye. I felt its coldness run
inside me. Towards the end, my arm was cramping from holding still in a perfectly straight line,
but I was careful not to move because I didn’t want to restart. The scan was successful. I came
out of the tube, got dressed, and another researcher paid me again in cash. Although I was paid
and everyone I interacted with was polite and professional, I wouldn’t participate in a study
again. It was too much hassle and discomfort.
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5.2

A heretical interpretation.

My interior experience and thoughts were not significant to the MRI scan because it measured
physiology rather than activity through glucose uptake. However, the act of staying very still
through a somewhat uncomfortable 40 minutes would be difficult for many people, especially for
the “abnormal” candidates this study was seeking. I had to be a very ruly body to participate.
Throughout the study, I observed the difficulty of holding onto patients. Consider the criteria
steps that might have pushed someone to drop out.
Abnormal candidates must:
1. be willing to be participants in a study led by researchers they may not trust based on
previous experiences with psychiatry.
2. be “stable” with no recent changes in medication.
3. not have an additional diagnosis that may confound the study.
4. have a good internet connection.
5. be willing to share about an hour of personal information with a stranger.
6. be willing to come to the hospital in a pandemic.
7. have transportation to the hospital.
8. be willing to do a few hours of puzzles and memory tasks.
9. be willing to get a blood draw.
10. not have any metal in their bodies from previous surgeries.
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11. be willing to change into a hospital gown.
12. be able to lie still for 40 minutes with an IV in a loud, claustrophobic tube.
Undoubtedly, there are other obstacles I have overlooked.
I can understand why these studies are difficult to fill. I am an odd patient for being able to check
all these boxes. I imagine PET scan studies, which require radiated injections, would be even
more difficult to recruit because it includes more risk. I cannot speak to the exact experience of
PET scan study participants, but I imagine that they also have a strange, uncomfortable day
pulled from a science fiction movie. I am skeptical that the image of glucose uptake during a
“mood” or “thought” produced in a PET scan would represent glucose uptake in day-to-day life.
Before I got to see the <brain scans> themselves through a web portal, the radiologist included a
note that read “normal MRI of a brain.” It’s unclear if they meant a typical framing for the image
or if the brain itself looks normal. The report went on to say there are no signs for concern, like
tumors, herniation, hydrocephalus, or extra-axial fluid collections, amongst other things.
Although this <brain scan> was administered to identify a mental illness, the radiologist saw
nothing that would threaten my life or well-being.
When I opened the files, it was bizarre to recognize my profile and then try to categorize what I
saw for a few moments. It was somehow surprising that it so closely resembled what I saw in
textbooks. Subconsciously, I did believe there was going to be something odd. The image is
strictly black and white because it contains no statistical interpretation. Should I see it in a
academic journal, it may be amalgamated with the other abnormal brains and then marked to
show what is too large or small. In medical imaging, we search for what is wrong, what is
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curable. It is unexpected to look at ourselves through the machines with neutrality. I did not cry
like Dr. Amen’s patients. If anything, I saw my <brain scan> and felt fine with myself. Is my
body wrong if I am happy and conscious? I’m just grateful to be here.
McGee says such a heretical interpretation will be punished, and maybe that is why I chose to
not share the scans in this thesis. They feel somewhat obscene in a public place. A few of my
friends and family members have seen the <brain scans>, and most felt they were unsettling.
They had seen the <brain scans> of anonymous strangers and felt indifferent, but a slice of
someone they knew felt like an invasion of privacy, like I had shown them a clinical picture of
my breasts. Yet, maybe that discomfort is the mind/body dualism tugging at us. How could I be a
person and a brain at the same time? It is discombobulating to see a person holding the ideograph
that implies they are an empty body.
Should the images be published, I would consider claiming them as a social experiment. I
imagine posting a picture of myself holding a print-out of the study, grinning with a caption that
says, “That’s me!” When people hear of my diagnosis, they imagine an unhappy person and an
unreliable narrator. Both are sometimes true, but they are sometimes true for everyone. Being
conscious is difficult. Something about a smiling Ph.D. candidate holding the “proof” of their
aberrance would rustle the story of the dualism. It might also cut off career opportunities.
Colleagues with similar diagnoses have advised me not to go on the record about my specific
experience lest I want administrators to push me out. In the privacy of my home, the <brain
scan> persuades me in one way. Outside, it would persuade the world in another.
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6

How did the science get us here?

6.1

When bad science attempts to reify culture

Researchers have been scanning brains in search of a cohesive marker for mental illnesses for
decades. Yet, when you go to the psychiatrist, you are not run through a PET scanner or MRI
machine to get a diagnosis. There are several explanations for this.
Psychiatrists Surjo R. Soekadar and David Haslacher frankly state that they only use <brain
scans> to rule out pathologies like acute head trauma, stroke, or tumors. Discerning PTSD, OCD,
depression, borderline personality disorder, autism spectrum disorder and schizophrenia is, to
date, impossible (20). Individuals with the same diagnosis have a high amount of variability
between scans, and these diagnoses often blend into each other. For example, it’s common for
someone diagnosed with an anxiety disorder to also have compulsions or be depressed. If you
leaf through most pop explanations of <brain scans>, the amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and
anterior cingulate cortex come up over and over again across most diagnoses. It seems <brain
scans> may be photographing misery as a correlation, but not causation of DSM diagnoses.
Critics of <brain scan> studies have also noted how the processes for selecting candidates and
running the scans complicate the data: Small data pools—often around 12 “abnormal”
participants and 12 “normal” participants—do not produce statistically robust data (Thibault and
Raz 55). Fidgeting during MRI scans creates shadows on the images, which may explain why
post-mortem examinations of “tissue loss” do not replicate scans (Thibault and Raz 56). The act
of lying down also changes the neural activities PET scans seek to measure (Thibault 59).
Generally, participants are not in their usual state of mind during their scans, and those willing to
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participate are probably not representative of the patient population at large. In his book
Picturing Personhood, Joseph Dumit describes how the participant selection process for PET
scan studies of people diagnosed with schizophrenia tends to position “normal” as white, male,
drug-naive, and right-handed (63). Finding enough white, male, right-handed drug-naive people
diagnosed with schizophrenia becomes an enormous challenge. Even if they are successful, we
should be rightly skeptical of whether this tiny slice of the population can represent a state of
consciousness for all of humanity.
Scientists also concede their rhetorical aims in placing the images side by side. In a publish-orperish academic landscape with limited funding, they choose the images that display the most
dramatic differences to make their point (96). Beautiful PET scan images can put their research
on the cover of academic journals and news outlets, a boon to their careers (57; 99). The point is
not to render the most accurate representation of the data, but the most persuasive. Yet when
their studies fail to replicate, no one alerts the press.
The other limitation of <brain scan> studies is the assumptions underlying the proposed
hypothesis. In her analysis of a <brain scan> study that attempted to pin down a difference
between men and women in brain activity related to humor, Christa Teston demonstrates how
null hypothesis significance testing can become a rhetorical tool that validates socially
constructed assumptions. If you go looking for differences between men and women, a minor
finding can be infused with disproportionate meaning. The premise of the hypothesis itself seeks
a biological basis for socially constructed imaginings of masculinity and femininity. The
statistical findings were slim but still publishable. Now the pop-science journalist may take the
interpretation a step further and claim that women just don’t understand a good joke. To quote
Teston:
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The problem of “bad science” is greater than ideological constructions of what counts as
fact or sensationalized accommodations of scientific facts to lay audiences. The problem
of bad science is as much ontological as it is ideological or epistemological. It is as much
material as it is linguistic. (48)
When investigating psychiatric diagnoses through <brain scans>, we must also contend with how
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), the authoritative text that dictates who is diagnosed
with what disorder, is also culturally constructed. The DSM frequently changes. Diagnoses are
added and discarded by vote at the American Psychological Association. Looking back on the
DSM’s history, we find a slew of obviously socially constructed “illnesses,” the poster child
being “homosexuality disorder.” Disorders such as “victimization disorder” and “masochistic
personality disorder” have also been discarded once their existence became difficult to defend
politically (Kutchins & Kirk 8; 149). The inclusion of PTSD in the DSM was largely due to
political organizing from veterans’ groups, seeking more social support for traumatized veterans
(Kutchins & Kirk 100). Like the search for sex difference, the search for data on psychiatric
diagnoses through <brain scan> starts with a social category and then seeks data to validate that
difference.
In her book, Screening the Body, Lisa Cartwright investigates how film and photography
mediated medicine’s move from studying symptoms to sites of disease in the body as predicted
by Michel Foucault in The Birth of The Clinic, An Archeology of Medical Perception. Before the
time of the PET scan, neurologists created photo documentations of “hysterics” experiencing
“pathological movement.” The intent of the photos was to ground mental illness in the empirical
realm, particularly since Freud’s psychoanalysis was threatening the corporeal basis of insanity
being pursued by contemporary eugenicists. The mode of visual rhetoric flattens the
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photographed person into objectivity, both in that it carries the scientism of “objective data” and
that the objectified person cannot speak back. Then she goes on to note how a film of a patient
regaining consciousness after a seizure is cut short the moment he looks at the camera.
The neurological filmmaker is made uncomfortable by the comprehending gaze of the
patient, not because her look challenges the authority of his gaze, but because it reminds
him of his own inability to discipline the bodies of his charges, to make them perform their
illnesses on cue and involuntarily. (80)
Reading Cartwright, I think of how I disciplined my own body for the MRI scan in the <brain
scan study>. I was instructed to keep my arm with the IV straight and perfectly still for the
duration of the scan. After 30 minutes, my arm began to cramp, but I held myself still so we
wouldn’t have to start over. My ruliness enabled an image that will likely be used to train
scientists in seeing an abnormal body, but paradoxically one that could be disciplined. I can
approximate health with treatment, but inside me, there is still something presumed to be
fundamentally “Other.”

6.2

The problem of the voxel and the eliminationist materialism.

Here, it is worth visiting a passage from Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic:
In the rational space of disease, doctors and patients do not occupy a place as of right; they
are tolerated as disturbances that can hardly be avoided: the paradoxical role of medicine
consists, above all, in neutralizing them, in maintaining the maximum difference between
them, so that, in the void that appears between them, the ideal configuration of the disease
becomes a concrete, free form, totalized at last in a motionless, simultaneous picture,
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lacking both density and secrecy, where recognition opens of itself onto the order of
essences. (9)
One can easily apply such a scene to the neurologist poring over the <brain scan>. If they could
just clear all this damned static—the body in the way—the essence of a brain disease would
speak in the scan.
Rose & Abi-Rached, Dumit, and C. Fred Alford all point out a problem of scale in <brain
scans>. <Brain scans> often describe tissues in a standard unit of measurement called a voxel,
one millimeter of tissue cubed (Alford 86). Although it is around the size of a grain of sand, a
voxel of brain tissue contains many millions of neurons. The assumption that a voxel is the
appropriate unit for measuring brain activity is driven by the PET and MRI scanner parameters.
A few neurologists with a sense of humor did an MRI <brain scan> of a dead Atlantic salmon
and found that the voxels of dead fish’s brain matter were “lighting up” as they “saw” photos of
social situations. In the subsequent poster presentation, they wrote, “Can we conclude from this
data that the salmon is engaging in the perspective-taking task? Certainly not. What we can
determine is that random noise in the EPI timeseries may yield spurious results if multiple
comparison are not controlled for” (Bennett et al.).
In the unit of the voxel and the quest for experimental “control” we may find an apt metaphor for
the problem of eliminationist materialism emblematic to <brain scans>. In saying the problems
of the MRI scan are uncontrolled results, there is an implication that with proper study design
and perhaps better technology we’ll get to the bottom of it. The neurologists will one day snap a
proper photo of brain in the midst of an emotion or condition. Without predicting the future of
<brain scan> capabilities, I want to examine the assumption that <brain scans> will inevitably
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advance to validate narrowly asked questions. It seems hardly scientific to select a predetermined
outcome and then use science to validate it. What does this atomized version of the mind mean to
the scientific world view?
John Kihlstrom describes the material eliminationism of the belief that our understanding of
mental phenomena becoming tied to our material neurology as “a rhetoric of constraint” (759).
The idea that the material condition of the mind will reveal “the truth” at the level of neurons
closes off discussion of consciousness as an emergent property. If you asked me what riding a
bicycle is and I labeled all the atoms involved in the titanium, it would not be so helpful as me
showing you a bicycle in action. We may also consider Robert Pepperell’s metaphor of
consciousness:
Consciousness can only be considered as an emergent property. In this sense it is like
boiling: given sufficient heat, gravity and air pressure the water in a kettle will start to boil.
We can see what boiling is, we can recognize it as something to which we give a name, we
do not consider it mysterious, yet we cannot isolate it from the conditions which produced
it. Likewise, consciousness is a property that emerges from a given set of conditions.
No doubt, understanding kettles is a useful and interesting enterprise, but a kettle is not the
phenomenon of boiling. Still, CNS hopes that by getting more sophisticated instruments
dissecting the kettle on the molecular level consciousness will become clear. Even if they do find
a material difference in the bodies of neurodivergent people, what does it mean to them? When
“non-scientists” critique atomization, they are not just being sentimental. There are other viable
questions in play if we permit ourselves to consider them. Atomization may be taking us further
from the appropriate scale of the question. The voxel of the <brain scan> is simultaneously too
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large to capture the activity of neurons and too small to capture the experience of living in a
complex environment.
In the tradition of positivism, anyone who critiques the quest for empirical atomization is cast as
“unscientific” even though using data to drive at a predetermined solution is rather unscientific
itself. Stengers describes the problems of positivists in her book, The Invention of Modern
Science. Aligned with Foucault, she observes how controlling factors in the lab for the sake of
medicine demands reducibility and turns all other factors—the patient, the complexities of living
outside that lab—as obstacles. She describes the positivistic drive to reduction and elimination as
a “mobilization,” an almost militaristic deployment of science, particularly quantum physics, to
conquer all spaces of knowledge. “The great mobilizing narratives have always defined progress
in the mode of asymmetry: the power of the person who advances in the name of science, and
who is distrustful of the ‘opinions’ of those who occupy the territory to be subjected” (118). The
ones who occupy the territory in the case of neuropsychiatry in this case are the disabled people
who may like to decline treatment, but alas the tanks have already rolled in.
Stengers also writes, “The sciences are not, by destiny, the allies of power, but they are, by
definition, vulnerable to all those who can contribute to the creation of differences, the
stabilization of interests, the disqualification of annoying questions, the facilitation of the product
of laboratories” (125). When applied to medicine, scientific mobilization driven to reduce is
especially susceptible to political efforts like eugenics. The quest to isolate diseases into a
heritable trait and the logic of removing “imperfections” from bodies or the human population at
large fits comfortably with the drive to atomize until science can draw a boundary around
complexity and excise it.
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A chemist herself, Stengers proposes not dismantling the sciences but creating a rhizomatic
network where “the public” and other “non-scientists” may speak back on the production of
knowledge. This is not at the detriment of “good science.” Instead it pushes science into a riskier
place, outside the lab where the real world adds complexity. When I was a participant in the
<brain scan> study, how would the assumptions of the study have been changed if I could have
told the researcher conducting the interview that their question was poorly asked? What if I
could have asked what they intended to know and helped them reformulate a better question? It
likely would have taken more time and money than their grant permitted. Their colleagues may
have scoffed at polluting a respectable science with uncontrolled variables, but I suspect the
knowledge generated from such a study would have been more useful than another spread of
voxels.
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7

Rethinking accountability and neurodivergence

Calls to return to mass sterilization and genocide are currently outside of polite political
discourse, in that most politicians can no longer openly condone the practice in American
politics. However, the call to return to an asylum system, where the mentally disabled will be
warehoused out of sight, is still on the table. In addition to the existing policy of mass
incarceration in jails, Pres. Donald Trump proposed bringing back mental asylums as a solution
to gun violence (Freking). Vice Pres. Kamala Harris also proposed in her 2020 campaign an
expansion of powers to forcibly medicate and confine psychiatric patients to the dismay of
disability activists (Luterman). This is all to say, eugenics is a light sleeper and identifying how it
moves rhetorically in public discourse has high stakes.
When discussing my research with people in my life, the conversation often takes a turn where
the other person either tells me about their grief for a neurodivergent family member or their fear
of mass shooters. Couched in these stories is a question: “But what am I supposed to do when I
am scared?” I acknowledge there are circumstances where we must stop harm. If someone is
standing on the edge of a bridge, ready to jump, we should try to save them. If someone is hitting
another person, it is justified to use an amount force to stop the assault. No neurotypical or
neurodivergent person is obligated to absorb abuse. In our current situation, we often find
ourselves boxed in with poor options. What will it be: the prison or the street? Sometimes
neurodivergent people do hurt others in a state of confusion, fear and/or rage, and discussing the
abstractness of social constructs usually does not make the injured party feel better.
The frustration families feel when I critique NAMI and psychiatry is legitimate, but misdirected.
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Are we actually happy with the current situation? I borrow extensively from Angela Davis’s
book Are Prisons Obsolete? in my thinking here. Instead of changing the law to expand
institutionalization, it’s time to address ableism, racism, homophobia, misogyny and poverty. It’s
a daunting project. As Davis puts it, “…rather than try to imagine one single alternative to the
existing system of incarceration, we might envision an array of alternatives that will require
radical transformations of many aspects of our society” (108).
I’ve never heard of a disastrous outcome that wasn’t first paved with years of suffering and
ableism. In my own experience, neurodivergence can feel like experiencing consciousness with
high malleability. You can learn what to let in and what to let pass through, but you need time
and support to practice. I can easily see how even well-resourced neurodivergent people struggle
to thrive as their communities tell them again and again that they are shameful, scary burdens.
When well-meaning families rush to enroll in NAMI support groups to grieve the existence of
their neurodivergent family members, their ableism is absorbed into their loved one’s
consciousness. We need to interrogate our fear when encountering neurodivergence. Is there a
problem or are we just encountering the unexpected? Is anyone actually being harmed? If
someone must intervene, what is the least forceful way to do so? Respect the person before you
as a complete mind and body fusion, rather than grieve for an ideal essence that was never
present in the first place.
Ostracization and the violence of incarceration compounded with housing and food insecurity set
neurodivergent people up for terrible outcomes. I suspect stereotypical symptoms of mental
illness are not destiny but the uniquely visible form of neurodivergent misery in a hostile world.
This approach is like looking at everything but the <brain scan>. Instead of asking what is wrong
inside the brain, we ask, how is the world marking this body?
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Part of respecting the personhood of neurodivergent people is also rethinking accountability.
NAMI thinks it is helping neurodivergent people by saying a disease is at fault when they
commit harm. I disagree. For the sake of your relationships, if you hurt someone, even by
accident in the midst of mania or psychosis, you should apologize. NAMI’s desire to blame the
disease comes out of the correct intuition that something is wrong with the justice system.
However, instead of rethinking prisons, the NAMI proposes scaling up incarceration while
removing formal criminal convictions. Erasing accountability sows resentment. It disrespects
both the harmed and responsible party and feeds into narratives about disability as a burden.
Instead, we should ask how neurodivergent people can be treated as whole and accountable
persons in a community without prisons? This model creates respectful boundaries that leave
everyone better off.
Earlier in this thesis, I discussed the case of the veteran in The Body Keeps Score. I find this
book frustrating because van der Kolk nearly reaches a social model of disability. We are our
bodies. We are material, and the material world marks us. Trauma is underacknowledged in
psychiatric treatment. He has acknowledged the touch of the world on the margin of the body,
but then focuses only on certain bodies for treatment. When I read about how the veteran had
committed an atrocity in Vietnam, I was disturbed, but I also remembered a news story I had
read some time ago. After struggling with PTSD for decades, American veterans returned to
Vietnam to complete works of restorative service like removing land mines. Their “brain
diseases” abated once they atoned and spoke honestly about the harm they had done. To quote a
veteran named Chuck Searcy said, “When I’m in the United States, the Vietnam War haunts me
every day and every night. When I’m in Vietnam, the American War has been over for 45 years”
(Graceffo). It’s a radical “cure,” yet so intuitive.
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Van der Kolk can’t approach solutions rooted in social justice because he’s so focused on his
ideographic <brain scans>. It’s not a coincidence that restorative action after a war opens
difficult questions. If we begin acknowledging “the enemy” is actually just people, the state is
going to struggle to justify the next war. I don’t anticipate <brain scan> studies will stop anytime
soon. However, the next time you see a <brain scan>, ask yourself, who had to disappear to
make this image persuasive?
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